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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1. Background to the study  
 
Local government is arguably the most significant sphere of government to lay 
citizens, as it is the point of contact of citizens with their government. Local 
government enables a direct link between the general public and the basic 
services that they are entitled to by means of their constitutional and legislatively 
entrenched rights. It is the only sphere of government that allows and 
encourages face-to-face engagement between citizens and their governors, 
providing the necessary platform for interaction, contact and communication. It is 
imperative therefore that this tier of government operate optimally and 
competently, as it represents a reflection of the operation of government wholly.  
 
Research unfortunately illustrates that public perceptions of local government are 
negative, with levels of trust in local government being substantially lower than 
those in provincial and national governments.1 The responsibility for failure to 
perform would lie squarely on the shoulders of those individuals leading any 
institution. The leading incumbents driving a municipality are the political and 
administrative heads, i.e. executive mayor and municipal manager. 
 
Whilst legislation2 dictates specific as well as self-regulatory duties to both 
individuals, the lack of required competency; political dominance and power 
struggles; and lack of effective accountability and oversight structures can and do 
have detrimental effects on the smooth functioning and competency of 
municipalities.  
                                                 
1
 Jaap De Visser The political administrative interface in South African municipalities assessing the quality 
of local democracies (2010) 87 and Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs State 
of Local Government in South Africa: Pretoria (2009). 
2
 Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 and Municipal Finance 
Management Act 56 of 2003.   
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The purpose of the research paper is, in analysing the legislation that shapes the 
duties of the executive mayor and municipal manager, to assess how, in practice, 
this legislation falls short when being implemented. The paper will identify the 
anomalies in the relationship between the executive mayor and the municipal 
manager in practice and recommend solutions that would create a better rapport 
between them.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement  
 
Local government is plagued with the misfortune of being void of a distinct 
dividing line between the political and administrative elements in a municipality. 
This is typically manifested in one of the two scenarios which relate directly to the 
overlapping roles of the municipal manager and executive mayor: 
 
1) A competent municipal manager is unable to carry out his or her 
functions effectively due to the constant interference by the executive 
mayor, who is often instructed by external political structures.  While 
the municipal manager is by law deemed the accounting officer of the 
municipality, he or she is not in as much control as would be expected, 
despite being the individual who is ultimately responsible and 
accountable for municipal affairs.  
2) A municipal manager holds a senior position in a political party, either 
locally or regionally. In the situation where the municipal manager is 
also a politician, this then can result in the administrator unduly 
interfering in the politics of the council. 
 
 In both of the above scenarios there exists an encroachment of functions, where 
the system of accountability fails.  
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The prevalent argument in the current discourse suggests that, should the terms 
of reference3 and delegations4 provisions of the Municipal Systems Act be 
utilized optimally, whereby precise roles and responsibilities, including delegated 
responsibilities are outlined by municipalities for political office bearers, 
structures and the municipal manager, this would to a large extent address the 
interface dilemma.  
 
While it is agreed that there is indeed a need for better defined terms of 
reference, it is argued that this alone would not suffice in addressing the problem 
areas in the interface. It is proposed that should certain legislative reform which 
is currently underway, be implemented together with further suggested 
institutional changes, this would be beneficial in improving the interface of the 
municipal manager and executive mayor.   
 
1.3 Scope and objective  
 
The research paper is focused at comparing the objectives set out by legislation 
to define the roles and responsibilities of the municipal manager and executive 
mayor, respectively and to compare these to the outcome in practice. 
 
The paper commences with an historical overview of local government in South 
Africa, its transition over recent years, to the current. A thorough exposition of the 
roles of the executive mayor and municipal manager, as required by legislation, 
is provided. Thereafter is a depiction of what practice reveals about the 
relationship between the executive mayor and municipal manager, which is 
followed by a discussion and analysis of how the intended legislation differs to 
practice. An analysis and discussion of the potential effect that legislative reform 
would have on the interface debacle is provided. A number of further possible 
solutions to counter the irregularities in practice are suggested in conclusion.  
                                                 
3
 S 53 Municipal Systems Act.  
4
 S 50 Municipal Systems Act.  
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1.4  Methodology  
 
A diverse research approach was utilized, which consisted of the following 
primary research methods: 
 
1.4.1 Desktop Study  
An in-depth study of all legislation relevant to the focus of the research paper 
was undertaken. A wide array of literature available on the subject was perused.  
 
1.4.2 Interviews 
Qualitative, empirical research was conducted in the form of semi-structured 
interviews that were held with two ex-executive mayors and two ex-municipal 
managers.  
 
An attempt was made to interview several more executive mayors and municipal 
managers within the same province as the current interviews were undertaken. 
However, due to a politically turbulent period experienced in local government 
within the province, many prospective interviewees declined to be interviewed on 
the last minute citing the prevailing political circumstances as being inappropriate 
to discuss matters relating to the subject of the research paper. 
 
Being fully conscious of the limited sample of interviewees, confidence in findings 
derived from the interviews is confirmed by findings of other reports and studies 
undertaken within the same area of research. 
 
1.4.3 Previous research undertaken  
The paper draws to a large extent on academic research that was undertaken 
previously, which addresses issues that are analogous to the current. A specific 
document that was largely relied on in research is a report that was compiled by 
 
 
 
 
   
 
9 
the Community Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape, titled The 
Quality of local democracies: a study into the functionality of municipal 
government arrangements,5 where key role players, including the municipal 
managers and executive mayors were interviewed in four different municipalities. 
The findings in the State of Local Government in South Africa report prepared by 
the national Department of Coorperative Governance and Traditional Affairs6  
were further relied on for research purposes.  
 
1.5 Chapter Delineation  
 
The study is divided into six chapters.  
Chapter 1 is an introduction, which sets out the background of the study, the 
focus and objectives of the study, the problem statement and the methodology of 
the research. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction into local government in South Africa. The 
chapter provides a contextual outlook of the current scene at local government, 
within its historical background. The marked characteristics of local government 
are described, as well as the different systems of operation affecting the role of 
the executive mayor.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the executive mayor and municipal manager. Each 
incumbent’s role as provided for in legislation is described, followed by an 
analysis of how the roles relate to each other. The chapter is concluded by a 
discussion of relevant case law that has had an effect on the ability of the 
executive mayor to discipline the municipal manager.  
 
                                                 
5
 Jaap De Visser, Annette May and Nico Steytler The quality of local democracies: a study into the 
functionality of municipal government arrangements (2009).   
6
 CoGTA (2009). 
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Chapter 4 provides an exposition of what practice reveals. This chapter identifies 
the topical issues that had emerged through research, which affect the 
relationship between the municipal manger and executive mayor. 
 
Chapter 5 explores the legislative reform that is currently underway, and includes 
an assessment of the effect that this reform would have on the interface of the 
executive mayor and municipal manager.  
 
Chapter 6 concludes the study by providing several further recommendations to 
be instituted in order to facilitate a positive change in the executive mayor / 
municipal manager interface.  
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Chapter 2: An introduction to local government in South Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In order to fully appreciate the manner in which the functions of the municipal 
manager and executive mayor relate to each other within the local government 
domain, it is important to understand the framework within which the two 
individuals operate. This chapter will provide a background of the local 
government context within which the two players function, with a peak into the 
recent history of local government and then an overall depiction of the current 
status of local government in South Africa.  The chapter will then proceed to 
outline the duties of the political and administrative arms of local government, as 
collectives. A brief comparison of the executive mayoral and collective executive 
systems of local government will conclude this chapter.  
 
2.2 The transformation of local government in South Africa 
 
 2.2.1 Local government under apartheid 
The tone for the recognition of local government within this era was set back in 
1910 already, with the establishment of the Union of South Africa, where local 
government was to be the responsibility of the provinces.7 Central government at 
the time showed little interest in local government or the development thereof.  
Legislation dealing with local government for cities at the time was the domain of 
the provinces, while national legislation dealt with the administration of black 
areas. Local government was the lowest tier of government, with no 
constitutional protection or significant rights or powers, and was subservient to 
central government.8 Local government was distinctly plagued by an unequal 
                                                 
7
 E Mavhivha Leadership and government persepectives in local government administration in South 
Africa: Limpopo province (2007) 2. 
8
 Jaap De Visser Developmental local government: a case study of South Africa (2005) 58. 
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distribution of resources along racial lines, where “white” areas were more 
developed than any other.9 
 
 2.2.2 Local government post-1994 
With the departure of apartheid, local government found a new, fully-fledged 
status, where an entire chapter of the Constitution is now allocated to 
entrenching powers and rights to local government. It is recognized as an 
independent “sphere”, and no longer a “tier” of government.10 Consequently, the 
standing of local government is markedly different to what it was under the 
previous political dispensation. Local government is now seen as a dynamic 
driver of service delivery and local development, where its independence is given 
effect to by legislation. 
 
In the case of Fedsure Life Assurance and Others v Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council11 the Constitutional Court confirmed that local government 
is no longer a body that merely exercises delegated powers, but that a municipal 
council is instead “a deliberative legislative assembly with legislative and 
executive powers recognised in the Constitution itself”.12 
 
 2.2.3 Local government presently 
As noted above, the newly-founded responsibilities of local government are many 
and cumbersome. Section 152(1) of the Constitution describes the objects of 
local government to include: the provision of a democratic and accountable 
government for local communities; to ensure the sustainable provision of 
services to communities; the promotion of social and economic development, 
safe and healthy environment and to encourage the involvement of communities 
and community organizations in the matters of local government. Needless to 
                                                 
9
  Nico Steytler and Jaap De Visser Local government law of South Africa (2007) 1-8.  
10
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 7.  
11
 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and 
Others 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) para 26 (hereafter Fedsure). 
12
 Fedsure para 26.  
 
 
 
 
   
 
13 
say, these expectations require local government to act competently, effectively 
and efficiently.  
 
However, practice reveals that local government under the current administration 
is not operating optimally. This state of affairs was alluded to in the working 
document of the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 
State of Local Government in South Africa report, wherein it is unequivocally 
stated: “From evidence to date, it is clear that much of local government is 
indeed in distress, and that this state of affairs has become deeply-rooted within 
our system of governance”.13 
 
The following were identified as priority problem areas in service delivery and 
governance at local government, requiring urgent attention:  
 
• Huge service delivery and backlog challenges, e.g. housing, water and 
sanitation; 
• Poor communication and accountability relationships with communities; 
• Problems with the political / administrative interface; 
• Corruption and fraud; 
• Poor financial management, e.g. negative audit opinions; 
• Number of (violent) service delivery protests; 
• Weak civil society formations; 
• Intra- and inter-political party issues negatively affecting governance and 
delivery; and 
• Insufficient municipal capacity due to lack of scarce skills.14 
 
It can thus be deduced, that while local government now enjoys a significant 
amount of autonomy and independence, this does not come without a great 
                                                 
13
 CoGTA (2009) 3.  
14
 CoGTA (2009) 3.  
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responsibility, competency and management requirements, which evidently are 
lacking within the system.  
 
Such a negative predicament casts a direct reflection on the people who are in 
charge of running a municipality. The following is a brief overview of the function 
of the political and administrative personnel arms of a municipality, of which the 
executive mayor15 and municipal manager are the heads, respectively.  
 
2.3 The political / administrative interface 
 
2.3.1 The role of politicians in local government administration  
Councilors are representatives of the people, who receive their mandate to rule 
from the people and therefore must rule to the best that they are able.16 They are 
further legislators, who also ensure and oversee the execution of their directives 
as such.17 Essentially, the political arm of local government is there to formulate 
by-laws and council decisions, as well as guide and monitor the activities of the 
municipal administration.18 For purposes of this paper, the executive mayor is the 
political head of the municipality. This is to be distinguished from the executive 
council system of a municipality.  
 
2.3.2 The role of administrators in local government administration 
The role of administrators is to understand and coordinate public policy and to 
interpret policy directives to the operating services, with unwavering loyalty to 
their political counterparts. This role is essentially to give effect to the decisions 
undertaken by the politicians. The municipal manager is the head of the 
administration. 
 
                                                 
15
 For purposes of this paper, the executive mayor system will be alluded to. This can be distinguished from 
the executive committee system, wherein the executive committee’s role to a large extent emulates that of 
the executive mayor in an executive mayoral system. 
16
 Mahviva (2007) 121. 
17
 Mahviva (2007) 121. 
18
 Mahviva (2007) 121. 
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The relationship between the political and administrative arms of a municipality 
should not be viewed as a master / servant relationship, but is rather a multi-
faceted and complex one.19 It is against this background that the complicated 
relationship between the executive mayor and the municipal manager stems.  
 
2.4 The executive systems in local government  
 
The executive arm in local government takes one of two forms, the executive 
mayoral or the collective executive system. The role of the mayor in each of 
these systems differs, with the executive mayor being the head of the executive 
and afforded much authority in the former system and the mayor being stripped 
of such extensive power in the latter system.  
 
A brief overview of the two executive systems follows below, to the extent that a 
description of the role of the mayor in each system is provided.   
 
2.4.1 The executive mayoral system 
This system allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive 
mayor, in whom the executive leadership of the municipality is vested.20 The 
executive mayor is assisted by a mayoral committee, who he or she appoints. 
The focus of the paper proceeds on the assumption that a municipality embraces 
this executive system.  
 
2.4.2 The collective executive system 
This system is less popular. The collective executive system allows for the 
exercise of executive authority through an executive committee, in which the 
executive leadership of the municipality is collectively vested.21 The power and 
functions that are attributed to the executive mayor within the executive mayoral 
system are to a large degree similar to those ordained on the executive 
                                                 
19
 C Cameron Politics-administration interface: the case of the City of Cape Town (2003) 55.  
20
 S 7(b) Municipal Structures Act.  
21
 S 7(a) Municipal Structures Act.   
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committee within the collective executive system.22 Within the collective 
executive system, the functions of the mayor include presiding at meetings of the 
executive committee and performing duties which include ceremonial functions 
and those delegated to him or her by the council or executive committee.23 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a concise overview of the system within which 
executive mayor and municipal manager function. The precise role of each 
individual, as prescribed by legislation follows in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 S 44 Municipal Structures Act. 
23
 S 49 Municipal Structures Act.  
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Chapter 3: The executive mayor and municipal manager: their 
roles in law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the role of the municipal manager and the 
executive mayor, and the manner in which each incumbent’s role impacts on the 
others. To achieve this, an exposition of the roles of each, the municipal manager 
and executive mayor respectively, as prescribed by the relevant local 
government legislation will be provided. A discussion on the manner in which 
legislation envisages these roles to interact with each other will follow. A 
prevalent theme that will emerge from the discussion is that while legislation 
elaborately defines the roles of each individual, it also to a large extent 
anticipates the roles and responsibilities of the municipal manager and the 
executive mayor to be somewhat “self-regulated”, especially as these roles relate 
to each others. To this effect the chapter will discuss the function of the “terms of 
reference” and “delegations” provisions in the Municipal Systems Act.24 A 
discussion of relevant case law that has to an extent extended the status of the 
municipal manager will conclude the chapter.  
 
3.2 The role of the executive mayor in legislation 
 
 “The executive mayor has the most robust range of statutorily defined 
functions… The mayor has the broadest scope of responsibilities and functions 
under both the Structures Act and the Systems Act.”25 
 
The above quotation provides a good reflection of the wide, far-reaching 
functions that an executive mayor potentially holds. The Municipal Structures Act 
                                                 
24
  Ss 50 and 53 Municipal Systems Act. 
25
 Jaap De Visser and Omolabake Akintan Institutional tensions between municipal chairpersons and 
executives: speaking of mayor conflicts (2008) 9.  
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posits the executive mayor as the political head of the municipality.26 The 
executive mayor is also the interface between the council and the administration 
within a municipality.27 Some of the important responsibilities of the executive 
mayor are outlined below: 
 
Council is largely dependant on the decisions of the executive mayor in matters 
of significance within the municipality. This can be attested to in section 30 of the 
Municipal Structures Act.28 Prior to taking any decisions involving any matter 
pertaining to section 160(2) of the Constitution,29 the approval or amendment of 
an integrated development plan30 for the municipality, and the appointment and 
conditions of employment of a municipal manager or head of department, council 
must first require the executive mayor to submit to it a report and 
recommendation on the matter.31 
 
The legislated duties of the executive mayor are extensive and far-reaching. In 
performing his or her duties, the executive mayor must identify the needs of the 
municipality;32 make recommendations to council on strategies to address such 
needs33 and identify and recommend the best strategy to deliver on the 
strategies.34 The executive mayor must further, in line with the above strategies, 
develop criteria in terms of which progress and implementation can be 
measured;35 review the performance of the municipality in view of general 
improvement36 and oversee the provision of services to communities;37 monitor 
                                                 
26
 De Visser and Omolabake (2008) 9.  
27
 De Visser, May and Steytler (2009) 11.  
28
 Municipal Structures Act. 
29
 S 160(2) Constitution includes the passing of by-laws, the approval of budgets the imposition of rates and 
other taxes, levies and duties and the raising of loans.  
30
 Hereinafter referred to as IDP.  
31
 S 30(5)(b) Municipal Structures Act. 
32
 S 56(2)(a) Municipal Structures Act.  
33
 S 56(2)(c) Municipal Structures Act.  
34
 S 56(2)(d) Municipal Structures Act. 
35
 S 56(3)(a) Municipal Structures Act. 
36
 S 56(3)(c) Municipal Structures Act. 
37
 S 56(3)(e) Municipal Structures Act. 
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the management of the administration;38 perform duties delegated to him or her 
in terms of council delegations39 as well as perform a ceremonial role.40 The 
executive mayor receives reports from council committees and forwards these 
reports, together with recommendations to the council, when the matter cannot 
be disposed of by the executive mayor in terms of the executive mayor’s 
delegated powers.41 
 
The Municipal Systems Act does not fall short in assigning onerous 
responsibilities to the executive mayor. The arduous task of managing the 
drafting of the municipality’s IDP lies squarely on the shoulders of its executive 
mayor.42 He or she must assign responsibilities to the municipal manager in this 
regard, and ultimately is responsible for submitting a draft plan to the council for 
adoption.  
 
Another significant responsibility of the executive mayor involves the 
management of the development of the municipality’s performance management 
system.43 Again, the executive mayor is placed in a position where he or she 
must, in this regard assign responsibilities to the municipal manager,44  
whereupon the executive mayor must submit the proposed system to the council 
for adoption.45 
 
An important element of the roles and functions within a municipality is the 
municipality’s delegation policy.46 In terms of delegation of powers, the Municipal 
Systems Act restricts two important issues to be delegated to the executive 
mayor exclusively. Decisions to expropriate immovable property,47 and the 
                                                 
38
 S 56(3)(d) Municipal Structures Act. 
39
 S 56(3)(f)  Municipal Structures Act. 
40
 S 56(4) Municipal Structures Act. 
41
 S 56(1) Municipal Structures Act. 
42
 S 30 Municipal Systems Act.  
43
 S 39(a) Municipal Systems Act.  
44
 S 39(b) Municipal Systems Act. 
45
 S 39(c) Municipal Systems Act. 
46
 Will be discussed at length below. 
47
 S 60(1)(a) Municipal Systems Act. 
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determination or alteration of the remuneration, benefits or other conditions of 
service of the municipal manager or managers directly responsible to the 
municipal manager48 may only be delegated to the executive mayor.  
 
The executive mayor is by no means absolved of financial matters within a 
municipality. In fact, he or she is deeply entrenched in the fiscal affairs of the 
municipality. Aside from having the budget preparation process imposed onto 
him or her, 49 the executive mayor bears the responsibility of tabling the annual 
budget before council50 and is also responsible for informing the MEC for finance 
in the province of non-compliance with provisions of the MFMA.51 
 
He or she bears the responsibility of providing general political guidance over the 
financial affairs, particularly the budget process of the municipality,52 and may 
monitor and oversee the exercise of responsibilities assigned to the municipal 
manager and chief financial officer in terms of the MFMA.53 The mayor must 
further ensure that the municipality perform its functions within the limits of the 
municipality’s approved budget,54 must at the end of each quarter report to 
council on the financial status of the municipality55 and must act in accordance 
with any further delegated duties assigned to him or her.56 The mayor bears 
cumbersome responsibilities in relation to the budget process and matters 
related thereto within the municipality.57 He or she further bears the onus of 
reporting to the provincial executive, should conditions within the municipality 
dictate so.58 
 
                                                 
48
 S 60(1)(b) Municipal Systems Act. 
49
 S 21 MFMA.  
50
 S 16 MFMA. 
51
 S 27 MFMA. 
52
 Ss 52(a) and 53(1)(a) MFMA. 
53
 S 52(b) MFMA. 
54
 S 52(c) MFMA. 
55
 S 52(d) MFMA. 
56
 S 52(e) MFMA. 
57
 S 53 MFMA. 
58
 S 55 MFMA. 
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3.3 The role of the municipal manager in legislation 
 
 “…the municipal manager is a key structure of a municipality and not 
merely a personnel appointment as contemplated in section 160(1)(d) of the 
Constitution”.59 
 
The municipal manager is the head of the administration of a municipality and the 
accounting officer.60 As is the case with the executive mayor, the responsibility 
and role of the municipal manager within the municipality is indeed a critical one. 
Whilst a large element of the responsibilities to be borne by the municipal 
manager is determined by council itself,61 legislation is specific on a wide array of 
duties that it imposes on the municipal manager. A synopsis of some of the 
crucial responsibilities to be borne by the municipal manager follows.  
 
Whilst, as noted above, the executive mayor is responsible for the management 
of the drafting process of the IDP of a municipality and the development of the 
performance management system, legislation dictates that the executive mayor 
must assign responsibilities in both regards to the municipal manager.62 While 
the executive mayor is responsible for the management of the processes, the 
municipal manager is yet responsible for the implementation and monitoring of 
progress with the implementation of the IDP.63 
 
As head of the administration of the municipality, the municipal manager is, 
subject to the policy directions of the council, responsible and accountable for the 
formation and development of an economical, effective, efficient and accountable 
administration that is equipped to carry out the task of implementing the 
municipality’s IDP, operating in accordance with the municipality’s performance 
                                                 
59
 Executive council of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 
of the Republic of south Africa; Executive Council of KwaZulu-Natal v President of South Africa and 
Others 1999 (12) BCLR 1360 (CC) para 109.  
60
 S 83 Municipal Structures Act. 
61
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management system and responsive to the needs of the local community.64 The 
municipal manager is thus responsible for the performance of many more people 
within the municipality than simply him or herself. He or she is responsible for 
appointment of staff,65 their management, effective utilization, training and 
maintenance of discipline.66 
 
Whilst not being involved in the actual decision-making of the council, the 
municipal manager is tasked with the responsibility of advising the political 
structures and office bearers of the municipality67 and managing communications 
between the administration and political arms of the municipality;68 while at the 
same time carrying out decisions of the political structures69 and implementing 
by-laws and legislation.70 
 
Furthermore and importantly, the municipal manager carries the overall 
responsibility for the municipality’s financial affairs.  In properly and diligently 
complying with municipal finance management legislation, the municipal 
manager is responsible for all income and expenditure of the municipality; all 
assets and the discharge of all liabilities of the municipality.71 
 
The specific requirements in terms of finance management include, amongst 
others: to administer and be accountable to the council for the municipality’s 
bank accounts.72 It is only the municipal manager or the chief financial officer 
who may withdraw money from the municipality bank accounts under certain 
listed circumstances.73 The municipal manager is liable for unauthorized 
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 S 55(2) Municipal Systems Act. 
72
 Ss 10(1)(a) and (b) MFMA.  
73
 S 11(1) MFMA. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
23 
expenditure deliberately or negligently incurred by him or herself.74 The 
accounting officer is under an obligation to promptly inform the mayor, MEC for 
local government and auditor-general of any unauthorized, irregular or fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure incurred by the municipality.75 As manager of the 
financial administration of the municipality, the municipal manager is responsible 
for the revenue 76 and expenditure77 management of the municipality. The 
municipal manager is compelled to report to the speaker of the council any 
interference by a councilor outside of his or her duties in the financial affairs of 
the municipality or in the responsibilities of the board of directors of the 
municipality.78 A huge responsibility assigned to the municipal manager is the 
implementation of the supply chain management policy of the municipality, which 
responsibility may not be impeded by any person.79 The municipal manager must 
take all reasonable steps to ensure that proper mechanisms are in place to 
minimize the likelihood of fraud, corruption, favouritism and unfair and irregular 
practices.80 
 
3.4 Terms of reference and delegation  
 
Over and above the above-mentioned vast responsibilities assigned to each, the 
executive mayor and the municipal manager as outlined, legislation provides a 
somewhat self-regulatory duty on the municipality as regards the roles of each of 
the incumbents above. This is to be given effect by two strategic documents in 
the municipality, which are closely linked to each other, namely the terms of 
reference and the delegations documents.  
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The terms of reference is a document that outlines the roles and responsibilities 
of political office-bearers, political structures and the municipal manager.81 The 
delegations document represents legal transfers of components of the council’s 
executive and administrative authority to political office bearers, political 
structures and the administration.82 
 
A brief description of what each of the documents entails follows.  
 
3.4.1 Terms of reference - Section 53 Municipal Systems Act 
 
The Municipal Systems Act makes it compulsory that each relevant person within 
the municipality be assigned a defined, precise and specific role and area of 
responsibility, which must be formulated in writing.83 The terms of reference must 
be acknowledged and given effect to in the rules, procedures, instructions, policy 
statements and other written instruments of the municipality.84 
 
Section 53(4) allows the terms of reference to include the delegation of powers85 
and duties to the relevant political structure, office bearer or municipal manager. 
It must be noted that whilst the provision allows for the delegation element in 
terms of section 59 to be “housed” within the terms of reference document, this 
does not absolve the municipality of in fact having a terms of reference (which is 
to be distinguished from the delegations requirement) as required for each 
relevant person.  
 
The terms of reference provision stipulates the degree to which each respective 
document is to be detailed. Section 53(5) requires that when defining the 
respective roles and responsibilities of each particular incumbent, the 
municipality must determine the relationships amongst those political structures 
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and office bearers and the municipal manager, and the manner in which they 
must interact. The Act goes further to require that the municipality determine 
appropriate lines of accountability and reporting for the political structures, 
political office bearers and the municipal manager.86 Mechanisms, processes and 
procedures for minimizing cross-referrals and unnecessary overlapping of 
responsibilities between the political structures, office bearers and municipal 
manager are also to be determined by the municipality,87 as well as mechanisms 
to facilitate dispute resolution.88 The municipality is further to put in place 
systems for interaction between the political office bearers, structures and 
municipal manager with other staff members of the municipality; and councilor’s 
interaction with the municipal manager and staff members.  
 
Legislation pertaining to local government does not, by any means fall short of 
placing specific responsibility on each, the executive mayor and the municipal 
manager. However, should there at all exist a void in regulating the relationship 
between the two office heads of the municipality, this is taken care of by the 
terms of reference provision which is pedantic about the detail with which the 
each incumbent’s respective roles n responsibility document be detailed.  
 
3.4.2 Delegations - Section 59 Municipal Systems 
Section 59 of the Municipal Systems Act dictates that a municipal council is 
required to develop a written system of delegation,89 in view of maximizing 
administrative and operational efficiency, and to provide for adequate checks and 
balances. The delegation system allows the council to either instruct any political 
structure, political office bearer, councilor or staff member to perform any of the 
municipality’s duties,90 and to withdraw such instruction.91 
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3.5 The executive mayor and municipal manager - how their roles relate 
 
Having provided a background of the duties assigned to each, the executive 
mayor and municipal manager, the paper will proceed to examine more closely 
certain legislative provisions that directly demand interaction between the two 
incumbents. An analysis of the relevant provisions contained in the Municipal 
Systems and Municipal Structures Acts will be followed by an assessment of 
provisions contained in the MFMA.  
 
 3.5.1 Municipal Structures and Municipal Systems Acts 
Section 30(5)(c) of the Municipal Structures Act holds that a municipal council 
requires a report and recommendation on the appointment and conditions of 
service of the municipal manager, from the executive mayor. Although council 
ultimately appoints the municipal manager,92 this provision provides an element 
of an employer-employee relationship between the municipal manager and 
executive mayor, in that the employment of the municipal manager and his or her 
conditions of service are directly dependant on the opinion of the executive 
mayor.   
 
 A legislative provision that again places the executive mayor in a position of 
authority over the municipal manager is section 56(3)(d) of the Municipal 
Structures Act. Albeit not directly creating an interface between the municipal 
manager and executive mayor per se, the provision indirectly infers the same in 
that as one of the functions of the executive mayor, he or she is compelled to 
monitor the management of the municipality’s administration in accordance with 
directives from the council.  
 
A provision protecting the municipal manager from political interference lies in 
Schedule 5 of the Municipal Structures Act, where it is unequivocally stated that 
a councilor may not interfere in the management or administration of any 
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department of the municipal council, unless the law allows or the councilor is 
mandated to do so by the council.93 Therefore, while the mayor is required to 
“monitor” and “oversee” the actions of the administration, this may be interpreted 
to be distinguished from “interfering” in the administration.  
 
Two critical tasks of the municipality include the drafting of the municipality’s IDP 
and the performance management system. In terms of the applicable legislative 
provisions, the executive mayor and municipal manager would be required to 
work closely on these tasks. Whilst the executive mayor is responsible for the 
management of both these processes, he or she is required to assign 
responsibilities to the municipal manager in this regard.94 Inevitably, this set-up 
creates a close working relationship between the executive mayor and the 
municipal manager. 
 
Whilst doing so in a somewhat elusive manner, with no clear “how to” directives, 
section 51 of the Municipal Systems Act imposes a duty on the municipality to 
establish and organize its administration. This should be done in a manner that 
would enable the municipality to establish clear relationships and facilitate co-
operation, co-ordination and communication between its political structures, 
political office bearers and administration. In turn, this would enable the 
municipality to organize all incumbents in a flexible way in order to respond to 
changing priorities and circumstances.95 The provision goes further in that it 
requires the municipality to assign clear responsibilities to management,96 and 
requires that the municipality facilitate the administration in such a manner that it 
may be in a position to hold the municipal manager accountable for the overall 
performance of the municipality.97 The overall tone of section 51 is somewhat 
analogous to that of the terms of reference provision described above, in that it 
insists on mechanisms being instituted to facilitate the smooth interaction 
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between the political and administrative arms within the municipality. Of course, 
this has a direct impact on the relationship between the executive mayor and the 
municipal manager, being heads of the political and administrative arms 
respectively.  
 
As mentioned above, section 60(1)(b) of the Municipal Systems Act restricts the 
matter of determining the remuneration and conditions of employment to be 
delegated to the executive mayor, exclusively. This provision clearly gives the 
executive mayor authority and leverage over the municipal manager. 
 
As part of the prescribed areas of responsibility assigned to the municipality, in 
terms of section 55 of the Municipal Systems Act, the municipal manager is 
responsible and accountable for managing communications between the 
municipality’s administration and its political structures and office bearers.98 It can 
thus be seen that while legislation places a responsibility on the municipality to 
ensure effective communication in section 51, it similarly places such a duty on 
the administration of the municipality. It can therefore be deduced that the duty to 
ensure clear, coherent relationships between the administration and the political 
structures and bearers within the municipality lies with both, the executive mayor 
as well as the municipal manager.  
 
3.5.2 MFMA 
Perhaps the most sensitive area of interaction and interface between the 
executive mayor and the municipal manager lies in dealing with municipal 
finances. The MFMA places large responsibilities on both individuals, often times 
to the exclusion of the other. Needless to say, such set-ups potentially create 
tension in an environment that is already laden with power struggles. In a 
nutshell, the MFMA disallows the executive mayor or political office holders from 
direct access to municipal finances. This is largely inconsistent with the authority 
and power accorded to the executive mayor in terms of other legislative 
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provisions. The paper will proceed to identify several instances where a distinct 
role of authority of one over the other is prevalent in the relationship between the 
executive mayor and municipal manager.  
 
Section 11 of the MFMA allows only the municipal manager or CFO ordinarily to 
withdraw or authorize the withdrawal of money from the municipality’s bank 
account/s. This is to the exclusion of the executive mayor. The same applies as 
regards setting up a relief, charitable, trust or other fund in the name of the 
municipality; only the municipal manger may be the accounting officer of such a 
fund.99 
 
Section 32 of the MFMA holds any person - municipal manager, political office 
bearer or official - responsible for unauthorized or wasteful expenditure, liable for 
that expenditure. However, if the municipal manager becomes aware that the 
council or mayor of the municipality has taken a decision, which if implemented, 
is likely to result in unauthorized, irregular or fruitless wasteful expenditure, the 
accounting officer is not liable, provided that he or she has informed the council 
or the mayor as the case may be, in writing that the expenditure is likely to be 
deemed as wasteful, etc.100 The accounting office must inform the mayor, MEC 
for local government in the province and the Auditor-General in writing of 
wasteful expenditure incurred.101 This situation has a potentially harmful effect on 
the relationship of the municipal manager with the mayor. Should the municipal 
manager have to inform the MEC of a wasteful expenditure incurred by the 
mayor, this could place much tension and be strenuous in maintaining a good 
working relationship for the two individuals.  
 
Section 52 of the MFMA outlines the responsibilities of the mayor, which include 
providing general political guidance over the fiscal and financial affairs of the 
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municipality.102 For the purposes of the current discussion, the provision allows 
the executive mayor to, in providing general political guidance, monitor and 
oversee the exercise of responsibilities assigned to the municipal manager. 
Importantly, he or she may not interfere in the exercise of these responsibilities. It 
is evident that the drafters foresaw a problem of interference by the mayors. 
Thus, an attempt was made to eradicate any ambiguity in this provision by 
expressly stating that the mayor may not “interfere”.  
 
The municipal manager is responsible for managing the financial administration 
of the municipality.103 As such, he or she is obliged to provide guidance and 
advice on the Act to political structures, office bearers and officials.104 At the 
same time, the municipal manager is at liberty to, and should promptly report to 
the speaker any interference by a councilor (which would include the executive 
mayor), outside the councilor’s assigned duties in the financial affairs of the 
municipality.105 
 
A sensitive issue in local government concerns the supply chain management. 
This is indeed an area from which, it will be shown below, much of the strain in 
the relationship between the municipal manager and the executive mayor stems 
from. The accounting officer is a key person in the supply chain management 
process, whereas the executive mayor is by law prohibited from being a part of it. 
In terms of section 115 of the MFMA, the accounting officer is responsible for 
implementing the supply chain management policy, and no person may impede 
the accounting officer in carrying out this function.106 
 
Whilst the municipal manager is entrusted with responsibility of supply chain 
management, the executive mayor is stripped of it. Section 117 of the MFMA 
unequivocally states that no councilor (including the executive mayor) of any 
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municipality may be a member of a municipality bid committee or any other 
committee evaluating or approving tenders, quotations, contracts or other bids, 
nor attend any such meeting as an observer. Section 118 of the MFMA 
somewhat reiterates and enforces the previous provision in providing that no 
person may interfere with the supply chain management system of a 
municipality. 
 
Having provided an overview of the various legislative provisions that create a 
direct bearing on the relationship between the executive mayor and the municipal 
manager, a notable distinction can be drawn between provisions of the Municipal 
Systems and Structures Acts, and the MFMA. Where provisions in the former 
pieces of legislation appear to place the municipal manager in a position of 
subservience to the executive mayor, the opposite is true in terms of provisions 
in the MFMA. The Municipal Structures Act places the municipal manager in a 
somewhat docile position, in that the very appointment of the municipal manager 
is dependant on the executive mayor. A strong focus on oversight of the 
administration and delegation by the executive mayor to the municipal manager 
in the Municipal Systems Act emphasizes the hierarchy of a municipal manager 
serving the executive mayor.  
 
However, the MFMA posits the municipal manager in a position of authority over 
the executive mayor, in that certain critical matters pertaining to finance and 
supply chain management are entrusted to the municipal manager, to the explicit 
exclusion of the executive mayor.  
 
It is thus evident, that while many of the duties, roles and responsibilities of the 
municipal manager and the executive mayor are distinctly outlined, and even 
where lacking, the terms of reference and delegations provisions are meant to 
provide clarity; there are many instances where the paths of the two incumbents 
cross in a manner that could potentially be destructive to their close relationship, 
due to the hierarchical effect that legislation has on their relationship.  
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3.6 Disciplining the municipal manager 
 
The case of Mbatha v Ehlanzeni District Municipality and Others107 has been 
significant in the interface of the executive mayor and municipal manager to the 
extent of disciplinary proceedings being instituted against the municipal manager. 
 
The issue before the court was whether a council can delegate the power to 
charge and suspend the municipal manager, to the mayor. 
 
While the court acknowledged that section 60 of the Municipal Systems Act came 
very close to giving the council authority to delegate the power to discipline the 
municipal manager, it did not extend that far. The Court neatly deduced its 
preference by noting the potential consequence of allowing the executive mayor 
the power to charge and suspend the municipal manager. The court held that it 
is-  
 
“…inevitable that, in the execution of their statutory duties, a conflict might 
arise between the municipal manager and mayor. It would not be 
desirable, in the administration of justice, that the municipal manager must 
live with the constant fear that, in the event of such conflict, the municipal 
manager is at the mercy of the a mayor with disciplinary powers.”108 
 
The court went further in eradicating any supposed “hierarchy” that exists within 
a municipality, and instead choosing a “just” method of dealing with problems, in 
the following assertion: 
 
“Justice would be better served, in my view, if both officials involved in a 
conflict situation, make representations to the council which in turn can, 
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after a deliberation on the matter, decide on whether any disciplinary 
actions ought to be taken, and if so against whom.”109 
 
The case of Mbatha is therefore liberating for the status of the municipal 
manager. While it is acknowledged that the decision to discipline or suspend the 
municipal manager may be implemented by the executive mayor, the decision to 
discipline or suspend the municipal manager can only be undertaken by the 
council itself.  The case therefore serves to protect the municipal manager from 
intimidation of the executive mayor. 
 
3.7 Conclusion  
 
The chapter has provided a detailed account of the duties of each, the executive 
mayor and municipal manager, as provided for in terms of legislation, as well as 
a description of the provisions that lead to interaction between the two 
individuals. Relevant case law that curbed the stance of the executive mayor in 
disciplinary proceedings against the municipal manager was discussed. The 
paper proceeds to examine what practice reveals about the relationship between 
the two leading figures within the municipality.  
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Chapter 4: The executive mayor and municipal manager: the 
challenges identified  
 
4.1 Introduction 
  
When assessing the extent to which the legislation delineates the roles of each, 
executive mayor and municipal manager, it would easily be assumed that the 
legislation is indeed all-encompassing, addressing every aspect of each 
individual’s roles and also the manner in which the roles relate to each other. 
However, practice reveals that despite the scope of the legal regulating and 
facilitating tools, the rapport between the municipal manager and the executive 
mayor is far from ideal. This chapter will reveal the anomalies of the relationship 
that were identified in the research undertaken.  
 
This component of the paper relies largely on interviews that were conducted 
with two ex-executive mayors and ex-municipal managers. The views expressed 
by the interviewees are supported by the findings in the report compiled by the 
Community Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape, titled “The quality 
of local democracies”,110 as well as the “State of local government” report 
compiled by the National Department of Co-operative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs.111 
 
A brief overview of the position of the interviewees is as follows: Both of the 
previous executive mayors interviewed served at their respective municipalities 
as executive mayors for an approximate period of four years. Both participants 
were dismissed at the beginning of 2010 by the ANC’s “provincial task team” 
which was deployed to the province in which they were based. Participants 
hailed from the same province, yet different municipalities. One of the executive 
mayors served in a local and the other in a district municipality.  
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Interviews were conducted with two municipal managers, both serving local 
municipalities within the same district as one of the executive mayors. One of the 
municipal managers served concurrently with one of the executive mayors 
interviewed, within the same municipality for the four year duration that the 
executive mayor was in office. He was not a member to any political party. The 
second municipal manager served for three years within his local municipality. 
He was at the time also the regional secretary of the ANC.  
 
Interviews were guided by a set list of questions,112 which were not mechanically 
adhered to. Interviewees were guaranteed absolute confidentiality, and assured 
that no reference would be made to their respective identities in the research 
paper or elsewhere.113 
 
The areas that were identified as being problematic in the relationship between 
the executive mayor and the municipal manager follow.  
 
4.2 Executive mayors cannot exercise their supervisory role as required 
by legal framework due to political deployments 
 
An enormous setback in the interface between the executive mayor and the 
municipal manager is manifested as a result of political deployments. The 
politically deployed municipal manager is directly associated with incompetence 
in the workplace. This, practice reveals, is a result of the municipal manager 
often ranking highly within the ruling political party, and as consequence, his or 
her role within the municipality being viewed to be of secondary importance. A 
further consequence of a politically appointed municipal manager lies in the 
inability of the executive mayor to discipline the municipal manager. This, again, 
is a result of the municipal manager ranking higher than the executive mayor 
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politically, and as such leaving the executive mayor in a vulnerable position, often 
him or herself answerable to the municipal manager, when in fact, in terms of the 
legal framework, the opposite is required.  
 
The executive mayor is often appointed by the political party. The result of this 
appointment is that often, the very cumbersome position of the executive mayor 
is filled by an individual who is simply ill-equipped to carry out the job. 
Consequently, the executive mayor is not in a position to exercise supervision 
over the municipal manager, as is required by law. 
 
Each of the above-mentioned consequences of political deployment will be 
explored below.  
 
 4.2.1 Incompetent municipal managers are appointed 
The reality of incompetent municipal managers was highlighted in interviews. 
This generally appears to be the case where municipal managers are leaders 
within political organizations. Juggling positions of leadership (within the 
municipality and within the political party) often creates an issue of “prioritizing” 
work, where duties within the municipality take a back seat. Once a municipal 
manager is a leader within the political party, there appears to be a sense of 
security for the individual as regards his or her position as municipal manager, 
which in turn results in the individual performing duties to a substandard degree. 
This is a consequence of the municipal manager being aware that his or her 
political ranking is high, and that he or she is therefore effectively in control within 
the municipality. There is thus no pressure to prove his or her ability within the 
workplace.  As a result, politically deployed municipal managers prove to be 
problematic “employees”, often being absent at their place of work and lacking 
control in their areas of duty within the municipality.114 The overall effect of this 
on the relationship between the municipal manager and executive mayor is dire, 
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as the executive mayor is dependant on the municipal manager to see to the 
implementation of practically all of the council’s decisions.  
 
An ex-executive mayor interviewed relays his experiences with two municipal 
managers who were politically deployed, whilst he served as an executive mayor.  
 
Mayor:  The first MM was a political deployee from the ruling party and a 
very senior leader of the SACP. The challenge that we had was that we 
could not account fully to National Treasury in relation to municipal grants, 
to the extent that the municipality had been receiving disclaimers 
constantly. We could not find documents for the Auditor General and 
National Treasury. There were times when the MM would be urgently 
needed; he would not respond to calls, SMS, etc.  We charged him and 
eventually fired him. 
. 
The second one was also a political appointee who used to be a politician 
in the national assembly. He came in very diligent. We agreed that every 
Monday we would meet and report to each other on what had happened in 
the previous week, so that there was a rapport between the offices. He 
started of very well, but ended up being a case that sometimes he was 
nowhere to be found. I recommended that he register for an executive 
course for municipal employees in order to try and build capacity so that 
he at least worked like within a private sector set-up. This too did not help 
because I picked up later that he would say that he is attending a course 
but he never even pitched up in class, so there was a complete fall-out. I 
had to go to court eleven times in order to fire him.  
 
Executive mayors thus have a difficult experience of municipal managers who 
are political deployees. It can be confirmed from the above that such municipal 
managers indeed view their role within the municipality with secondary 
importance in relation to their roles within their political parties. Incompetence, 
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inefficiency and simple disregard appears to be directly associated with politically 
deployed municipal managers, which in turn results in frustrating working 
conditions for the executive mayor, who is dependant on the municipal manager 
in many areas. 
 
The effect of having a politically deployed municipal manager in office can be 
vastly distinguished from one that is not a deployee. Research indicates that 
where a municipal manager is not affiliated to the ruling party, he or she is 
committed to their job. A municipal manager that can be entrusted with control of 
the administration and effectively see to the implementation of policy and 
directives within the municipality lifts a great deal off the shoulders of the political 
constituent. Having the ability and competency to carry out the duties and 
mandate of a municipal manager proves to have a good effect on the working 
relationship between the municipal manager and executive mayor. It allows for a 
smooth, cyclical system of efficiency and accountability. 
 
The following ex-executive mayor describes how employing a municipal manager 
who is not a political employee has numerous positive effects.  
 
Mayor: My working relationship with the MM was good. He had the 
capacity - he was part and parcel of the local government sphere for about 
19 years and knew what was expected of him. From an administrative 
point of view he also understood his limitations and his terms of reference. 
That makes it very easy to start a good rapport - based on what he knows. 
Within the environment in which he operated, he knew a bit of everything, 
so I could ask him financial questions and about corporate HR issues, 
public participation, etc. In spite of all the years, and given the background 
of politicians, he had a lot of respect for the political side of the 
municipality, giving the politicians space, especially myself; playing a very 
good advisory role with regard to what legislation required, he made it 
easy to work. 
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It can thus be seen that where a municipal manager is employed on merit, he or 
she is indeed focused on “the job”, and is in control of areas within his or her 
scope of duty. The municipal manager realizes that he or she is employed for no 
reason but their ability to carry out their functions effectively, and thus have good 
reason to ensure that their jobs are secure - this they do by working competently.  
 
In certain cases, notwithstanding the impressive résumés that municipal 
managers may hold, they yet do not have the commitment to their jobs within a 
municipality. Again, this is seen mostly in cases where the municipal manager is 
a person of political significance within the leading party, and the stark difference 
is evident when compared to municipal managers that do not hail from a political 
party. 
 
A respondent in an interview associates a general “don’t care” attitude with 
municipal managers who hail from the ruling political party. This is despite the 
individuals holding impressive qualifications.  
 
Mayor: It’s not that within the ANC you don’t have capable comrades - 
you have degrees all over the show. Most of the MM’s that get fired have 
got your masters and doctorates and when you have an interview with that 
person, they know their stuff like you won’t believe. They are attorneys, 
members of parliament, etc. It’s only after they are employed that you will 
have problems of incompetence and a “don’t-care” attitude”. 
 
It can thus be seen that appointing highly qualified people to the municipal 
manager position is not a determinant of the competency of the individual, 
especially when the incumbent is a political deployee. There is a sense that the 
person appointed to be a municipal manager should, together with qualifications, 
be somebody who has pride and commitment in the position. This is attested to 
by an ex-executive mayor who was interviewed.  
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Mayor: I agree that the position of the MM must be professionalized. 
However, the MM must also have the experience, the necessary skill, 
qualifications and, understanding also that he will always grow within the 
system…if you get the job, you must have the ability to care for that job.  
 
It is thus evident that commitment to the position of municipal manager is a vital 
requirement in the appointment of the municipal manager. Qualifications and 
experience alone are not conclusive in determining the ability of the municipal 
manager.  
 
In contrast to incompetency associated with a political appointment, a municipal 
manager who is not appointed on the basis of political affiliation and has a 
thorough understanding of his or her area of work proves to be in better control of 
his or her environment, and as such has a good work ethic. The relationship 
between the municipal manager and executive mayor is strengthened as a result, 
with the entire functioning of the municipality inevitably improving. This was 
confirmed in an interview with an ex-executive mayor, who shared office with a 
municipal manager who was not a political deployee.   
 
Mayor: I found somebody who has grown in the organization (the 
municipality).He comes from a managerial position, ended up being a 
departmental manager, then a director and in many instances became an 
acting MM, so he was aware of the environment. He knew the area in and 
out. You would just call a place and he would tell you what the problems 
are and how we can solve them. He was and still is good for the job. 
 
The true test in the appointment of a municipal manager lies in the commitment 
of the person to fulfilling his or her mandate as a municipal manager, as required, 
together with an absolute dedication to making the system work effectively. This 
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becomes challenging to achieve when the municipal manager is a political 
deployee.  
 
 4.2.2 Executive mayors cannot discipline municipal managers  
In a situation where the municipal manager is a political deployee, he or she is 
often always high-ranking within the political party, and almost always is the 
highest ranking political person within the municipality.  Of course the outcome of 
such a situation is abnormal, in that the oversight role that is to be exercised by 
the executive mayor over the municipal manager is somewhat reversed, and the 
executive mayor is unable to discipline the municipal manager, when the need 
arises. The reason for this is that the municipal manager is placed in a position of 
authority over the executive mayor, due to his or her political seniority. This 
creates a power issue, because the municipal manager, although answerable to 
the executive mayor within the confines of the municipality, knows that beyond 
the boundary of the municipality, the executive mayor is in fact answerable to him 
or her.  The practical consequence of this is that the executive mayor is placed in 
a compromising situation when the municipal manager needs to be confronted. 
Inevitably, this creates disorder in the functioning of the municipality.  
 
In an interview conducted with an ex-executive mayor, he describes the 
consequences of enforcing views that go against those of the politically deployed 
municipal manager. Such actions could lead the executive mayor to hot waters, 
to the extent that the municipal manager could insist that that the executive 
mayor be removed from office should he or she act against the municipal 
manager within the confines of the municipality. 
 
Mayor:  In many cases where the MM is a member of the regional 
executive of the ANC, he is actually the boss to the mayor when it comes 
to politics; the mayor is only his boss when it comes to the “show”. So you 
fix him in the office, next thing you hear is that the regional office is no 
longer happy with you, you must be removed. It should be streamlined in 
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terms of party policy and in government; that these guys who hold top 
positions within the party should not be allowed to be the MM, because he 
can tell me in the morning at the council meeting, that I, as chairperson 
instruct you to do so and so, don’t listen to me and we will meet in the 
regional office later. 
 
The effect that a politically appointed municipal manager potentially has on the 
relationship between the executive mayor and municipal manager can thus be 
seen being hazardous. The municipal manager is placed in an authoritative 
position over the executive mayor, which is certainly not what legislation 
envisaged for the relationship between the two leaders within the municipality.  
 
A further downfall of having a political deployee serving in the office of the 
municipal manager is experienced when the executive mayor is forced to consult 
with external political structures when it comes to matters pertaining to the 
municipal manager, particularly as regards disciplinary proceedings. Where the 
municipal manager is a political deployee, the executive mayor, instead of being 
able to discipline the municipal manager by means of internal municipal 
disciplinary recourse mechanisms, often has to revert to the political party, as the 
municipal manager is first regarded as a leader within the political party before he 
or she is regarded as an administrative appointment within the municipality. The 
consequence of constantly having to consult with people beyond the boundaries 
of the municipality inevitably leads to encroachment on the autonomy of the 
municipality. The effect that it has on the relationship between the municipal 
manager and executive mayor is inevitably frustrating, as the executive mayor is 
unable to act independently.  
 
The situation is described by an ex-executive mayor who was in office at the time 
that the municipal manager was a political deployee. 
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Mayor: When I started at the municipality, there were quite a number of 
things that were not going right because of him, but as you know the MM 
is appointed by the council, he was a political deployee of the party. I 
therefore had to refer back to the party without being able to reprimand 
him within the municipality. This was very frustrating.  
 
Besides encroaching on the autonomy and independence of the municipality and 
executive mayor particularly; having to constantly refer back to the political party 
in relation to matters concerning the municipal manager results in time being 
wasted. Where a matter could be sorted out promptly had it been dealt with 
immediately within the confines of the municipality, the process is now extended, 
with politicians making decisions  based on political and other factors rather than 
on merit. In a complex environment where the overall performance of a 
municipality is to a large degree dependant on the performance of a municipal 
manager, the inability of the executive mayor to regulate internal affairs without 
having to involve external structures is indeed frustrating.  
 
There is therefore a strong existing sentiment that individuals holding high 
ranking positions within the ruling political party should not be allowed to be 
appointed as municipal managers.115 It would appear that this would be the most 
effective manner of addressing the problems experienced in the case where the 
municipal manager is a political deployee. This opinion was shared by an ex-
executive mayor in an interview. The interviewee is of the opinion that municipal 
managers be appointed solely based on merit, as a huge part of the functioning 
of the municipality depends of the municipal manager. He or she should 
therefore be focused on the job.   
 
Mayor:  Until such time that MM appointments are based on 
professionalism, experience, effectiveness, efficiency and value for 
money; we will be fighting a losing battle. They should be employed on 
                                                 
115
 This view is supported in section 5 of the Municipal Systems Amendment Bill.  
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contract where you either produce results or get fired. Once we can do 
that and ensure that there is no political relation between that position that 
you hold in the party that you serve, you know that you are there based 
basically on merit. 
 
The MM is the ultimate decision maker, everybody in supply chain reports 
to the MM. When we dispense tenders, the MM will get people in who are 
sometimes brought in on the basis of their particular situation in the 
struggle, not on their necessary expertise. So they get embroiled in kick-
backs and all those peripheral things and ultimately you won’t find them in 
the workplace. They are always extinguishing fires that they have created 
themselves. 
 
Whilst practice shows a definite negative correlation to appointing a person with 
political ranking to the position of municipal manger, research conducted 
illustrates that this is not necessarily a favored opinion across the board. One ex-
executive mayor that was interviewed is of the opinion that it is irrelevant if the 
municipal manager hails from a political party or not. What is relevant, he 
explains, is the professionalism and integrity that the individual holds.  
 
Mayor: I agree that you need to professionalize the system with regard to 
appointments of MM’s, but I don’t believe that it matters from which 
political party that person comes. I would not care if a person comes from 
a political party, or what political party. I find it unnecessary to say that you 
should hold this position or cannot hold that position- I am actually taken 
aback in thinking that is it really necessary to go to that extent that we find 
ourselves saying that you cannot be a bishop in church because you are a 
MM. So for me, whether you are a leader in the provincial leadership of 
party A or party X, it is immaterial, as long as you know your 
professionalism and integrity. 
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It is thus evident that while research overwhelmingly suggests that there is a 
need to remove the element of political affiliation from the position of the 
municipal manager, there is a dissenting opinion that this would be futile if the 
individual does not hold integrity, in which case the individual would not be 
suitable to be the municipal manager anyway.  
 
4.2.3  Ineffectual executive mayor cannot supervise 
 
Executive mayors are often appointed by the ruling political party. Often, the 
appointment is not determined by the professional caliber of the individual, but 
instead by political and other factors. The end result is that the executive mayor 
is ineffective in exercising his or her supervisory role within the municipality.  
 
Whilst there is emphasis on the need to professionalize the position of the 
municipal manager, it is a fact that the duties entrusted to the executive mayor 
match those of the municipal manager in terms of requiring technical knowledge 
which must cover a wide array of areas, in order to effectively carry out same. It 
must also be borne in mind, that while the municipal manager is an 
administrative appointment, the executive mayor is a political one, where there 
exists no requirement of professionalism, or criteria that need to be fulfilled in 
order to take office. The consequence of this is inevitable. The executive mayor 
is often simply unable to exercise his or her duties proficiently, as he or she is 
incapacitated to do so. Since the municipal manager is largely dependant on the 
executive mayor in many ways, this can and does inevitably lead to frustrations 
for the municipal manager. The legal duties imposed on the mayor to this effect 
require the mayor to have technical knowledge in wide and far-reaching areas, 
as he or she is required to provide oversight, guidance and instruction to the 
municipal manager. Of course, if the executive mayor is in any way unequipped 
to do this, it creates volatility in an ideally harmonious state of affairs. The need 
for an individual who is able and competent to fill the position of the executive 
mayor is thus imperative. The following extract from an interview with an acting 
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municipal manager conducted as part of the De Visser, May and Steytler study 
provides a reflection of a situation where the executive mayor is not ideally 
equipped to carry out his or her duties  
 
Acting MM: Today’s mayor should also be a technocrat. There is thus a 
very thin line between the mayor and the MM. There is a clash of roles. 
The mayor is a political appointment, yet he must oversee the finances. 
The MFMA is very clear on this. There is a burden on the MM if the mayor 
cannot do the work. The mayor can’t be ceremonial. The fundamental 
deficiency of the system is that the mayor gets elected because he is 
popular, but then must assume technocratic functions. There is a constant 
fighting for turf to control between the mayor and the MM. A municipality 
thrives where the mayor is a technocrat.116 
 
The opinion that the position of the executive mayor needs to be filled by a 
competent person is the general consensus based on research, with executive 
mayors themselves conceding. An ex-executive mayor interviewed concurs that 
the position of an executive mayor should be filled by a competent individual, 
whose role goes beyond a ceremonial one. 
 
Mayor:  It is very important that the mayor is not appointed based on 
popularity - because he can sing or is known in the community. There 
have to be certain qualities that he holds. I think, in all fairness you need 
somebody who can understand and interpret the legislation, not 
necessarily a lawyer, but he must be able to think and give direction to 
that municipality. You can’t be a push-over. As much as you get a 
mandate from the party, you have to be sensitive to the fact that you are 
not the only party; that you have to actually be able to deliver services. 
You need people who would be able to hold the fort; who have the basic 
skills. 
                                                 
116
 De Visser, May and Steytler (2009) 28.  
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It is interesting to note that mayors themselves agree that the position of an 
executive mayor needs to be filled by a dynamic individual, who is an 
independent thinker and has the ability to identify the needs of a municipality 
beyond the mandate received from the political party.  
 
 4.3 Executive mayors exceed their prescribed supervisory role 
and interfere in the administration 
 
While legislation makes the role of the executive mayor, in relation to the 
municipal manager absolutely clear, in that it is one of “oversight”, which should 
be distinguished from “interference”, the reality of practice indicates that these 
concepts are often used interchangeably, where the executive mayor overtly 
interferes in the municipal manager’s domain of work.  
 
The appointment of a municipal manager is an administrative one. However, it 
must be noted that the municipal manager is appointed by the council. There is 
thus a strong sense of indebtedness and obligation that lies with the municipal 
manager, toward the executive mayor, as the political head of the municipality. A 
play on the emotions of the municipal manager as a result is common, and often 
there seems to be an unspoken expectation by the executive mayor of the 
municipal manager to carry out certain actions that extend beyond the scope 
concern of the executive mayor. This is attested to in the following extract by an 
ex-municipal manager who explains how a municipal manager is often at the 
mercy of his or her executive mayor.  
 
MM: The relationship between the municipal manager and executive 
mayor is regulated by a “psychological contract” or a “psychological 
mandate”. Psychological contracts do not find expression in any legislation 
or document… for example, there was a tender advertised. The mayor, 
knowing fully well that she is by law not to be involved in the process at all, 
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instructs me to pass the tender onto a certain department to be dealt with. 
What do I do? There is definitely a constant insecurity that you experience 
being a municipal manager. 
 
It can thus be seen that in certain instances the municipal manager is placed in a 
difficult position, having to decide on acting against the wishes of the mayor, or 
satisfying his or her own will.  
 
On the other hand, there are instances where the executive mayor has no regard 
for the opinion of the municipal manager, and simply oversteps his or her duty to 
oversee the functions of the municipal manager, by overtly interfering in the 
realm of the municipal manager. This is explained by an ex-municipal manager 
that was interviewed.  
 
MM: Our mayor does not understand the difference between “oversight” 
and “interference” at all. It makes carrying out your job as an accounting 
officer very challenging, when you are constantly inundated with 
commands from the executive mayor requiring you to carry out certain 
things that you know are not legitimate. It makes it very frustrating. 
  
It can thus be seen that while legislation attempts to regulate all aspects of the 
relationship between the municipal manager and the executive mayor, there is 
often an underlying understanding between the two incumbents that places the 
municipal manager in a vulnerable position.  
 
In one interview, an ex-executive mayor himself confirmed that mayors abuse 
their oversight role, to the point of frustration for the municipal manager:  
 
Mayor: Sometimes there is excessive interference from the executive 
mayor, wanting to know who is making tea in the municipality, how many 
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sweepers there are, and actually to the extent of bringing a list of the 
people who must be sweepers. 
 
The extent to which interference by the executive mayor permeates the 
municipality is thus evident. Executive mayors often have absolute disregard for 
the law which undeniably forbids interference in the administration. Municipal 
managers are then left in a catch-22 predicament, where they are fully aware of 
the illegitimacy of requests of the executive mayor, but for fear of being 
ostracized or even punished (by suspensions and threats of dismissals) they are 
forced to act in accordance with the request of the mayor.  
 
 4.4 External factors affect the legislatively prescribed relationship 
between executive mayors and municipal managers 
 
One of the most exasperating as well as damaging influences on the relationship 
between the municipal manager and executive mayor stems from external 
political structures. This is generally experienced at two instances, at the time of 
appointments and when awarding tenders. As the issue of appointments is an 
extensive one that has many implications for the municipal manager / executive 
mayor interface, it will be dealt with separately below.  
 
The exact status of the relationship between a political party and its deployees 
within a municipality is unclear, as attested to by all respondents. The exact 
status of autonomy of the politicians within the municipality is unknown. Are the 
councilors expected to accept directives on all matters from their political 
counterparts outside of the municipality, or is there a cap placed on how much of 
authority the external party structure holds within a municipality?  
 
What research does indicate is that the participation of external party structures 
is disparaging on the working in local government. Mayors themselves complain 
about the effect of external party interference within the municipal domain. An 
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interviewee who served as an executive mayor for four years describes the 
extent to which external political structures interfere within the municipality, 
especially as regards the awarding of tenders.   
 
Mayor: The tenders…sometimes mayors fall into that trap on the basis of 
external forces, that sometimes say: “We have seen in the papers that you 
guys have advertised for X…reverse it because you did not consult with 
us”. You find that you are stunned on the basis that you thought that you 
had a mandate in the form of the manifesto; how you implement it, you will 
then work out and streamline your policy, with the end result being a better 
life for all our people. But once you open your door there are people who 
come on their own terms- you do not have an understanding of how 
complex the situation is there. When you draw the line, it is like you are 
seen as being defiant. People who draw the line are not popular at all.  
 
It is hereby seen that external political forces have expectations to be involved in 
every step of procurement proceedings. Executive mayors who defy these 
instructions by acting unilaterally or who fail to consult with political authorities 
are not held in high regard.  
 
Another previous executive mayor confirms that the external influences are 
primarily concerned with personal monetary gain, and involve themselves in 
municipality affairs to the extent that they ensure personal enrichment.  
 
Mayor: As much as the legislation is intended to bring things together and 
say that we must bring stability, professionalism, less politics and come 
together in a common approach in moving forward, there will always be an 
influence by the external sphere, because people have their own 
preferences- it’s all about the cookie jar, whose fingers can be in the 
cookie jar. 
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It can thus be seen that while external political influences do not directly affect 
the relationship of the municipal manager and the executive mayor, the indirect 
effect that it has is paramount. As the accounting officer, the municipal manager 
is accountable for the overall functioning of the municipality. He or she is to be 
guided and overseen by the executive mayor. If the executive mayor is not in a 
position to guide, instruct or support the municipal manager, in the best interest 
of the municipality, the entire system of efficiency would be at a threat of 
collapsing. It is the external party structures that often have a hold on the 
executive mayor to this effect, as illustrated above. The executive mayor would 
receive directives from the political party, and then impose them on the municipal 
manager, or would simply act in a manner that is not in the best interest of the 
municipality, in order to satisfy the political party. This has a direct influence on 
the synergy that is to exist within the municipality, and thus a direct impact on the 
municipal manager who is in charge of implementation of policy.  
 
4.4.1 Appointments made by external political structures frustrates 
the relationship between municipal managers and executive mayors 
An area that directly affects the relationship of the municipal manager and 
executive mayor is that of appointments - appointments of the municipal 
manager himself / herself, the executive mayor and that of managers that report 
directly to the municipal manager. Appointments typically become an issue when 
they are carried out for reasons that are not tantamount to achieving that which is 
in the best interest of the municipality, but rather for self-serving, political or other 
needs. Most often the problems experienced in appointed people are those 
appointed as a result of influence exercised by external political forces. Once 
more, as a result, the synergy within the municipality is disturbed where some 
leaders are focused on achieving the best for their people, and others within the 
same arena are focused on fulfilling their own personal or party interests.  
 
The consequences of external political dictation in the appointment of the 
municipal manager go beyond incompetence. Once the individual identified for 
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the position is aware that he or she is favoured to be the municipal manager by 
the political party, but not within the municipality, this already creates tension in 
the working relationship within the municipality, once the individual is in fact 
appointed. An ex-executive mayor describes the practical consequence of a 
situation where the municipal manager is not preferred by the municipality, but by 
the political party. 
 
Mayor: In our area, one person was recommended as a municipal 
manager and we were very opposed on the basis that at the time we had 
also done background checks and found him to be somebody who really 
cannot be trusted. We decided to go to the political powers and present 
facts, and give our recommendations. They told us in no uncertain terms 
that: “you are going to appoint X”. Now already X knows that he was not 
preferred by this collective. When X comes in, we smile, we welcome him, 
but X knows: “you did not want me, I’m going to fix you up”, so already 
there’s a problem. The situation creates tension and will never be smooth 
moving forward.  
 
Evidently, in the above scenario, prior to the incumbent even taking office, 
tension would exist in the relationship between the executive mayor and the 
municipal manager, thereby setting a negative tone for a relationship that is, 
effectively, yet to be established.   
  
As explained above, the position of the executive mayor is a high-pressured one, 
where despite no formal requirements for serving in office as such existing, the 
nature of the portfolio of the position requires extensive knowledge and skill 
across a wide field. This is a result of the executive mayor being the political 
head of the municipality, and as such being “in charge” of all that happens within 
the municipality. The choice of individual to fill this position is therefore a critical 
one. Should the executive mayor be unable to carry out the duties as required of 
him, this again would frustrate the system of operation within the municipality, 
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particularly as regards the interface of the executive mayor and the municipal 
manager, who in terms of legislation are expected to share a close working 
relationship. 
 
The repercussions of appointing a mayor for reasons that primarily go beyond 
the individual’s ability to effectively see to the running of the municipality once 
again result in a situation of ineffective local governance. Of course, this leaves 
the municipal manager in an awkward position, where he or she either acts 
independently, irrationally, or is bullied into acting illegitimately by a mayor “who 
does not know any better”.117 
 
The manipulation by external political forces involved in appointing executive 
mayors is spoken of by executive mayors themselves. An ex-executive mayor 
who was interviewed relates the manner in which political parties deliberately 
place incompetent, impressionable individuals to act as executive mayors, with 
the sole purpose of being able to control the influential position of the executive 
mayor.  
 
Mayor: In some places the deployment (of the executive mayor) is done 
purely so that you have somebody that you can use as a yoyo, somebody 
that you can manipulate. You cannot sheepishly follow each other on the 
basis of a party, there has to be a clear difference between the party and 
the state. If you have somebody who, when the province says: “jump”, he 
says: “how high”, we are heading for a very dangerous situation… The 
party must have a system of carefully selecting the best to occupy that 
position, who would then be able to cut across all sections of our 
community, and you don’t get shocked when you as a professional are 
listening to this mayor and say: “oh my, are there no better people 
amongst us who can do that?” 
 
                                                 
117
 A full explanation of this dilemma is attested to in De Visser, May and Steytler (2009) 27. 
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The issue of appointments is thus problematic when it comes to that of the 
executive mayor as well. Research indicates that often times political parties 
deliberately appoint individuals who are not necessarily assertive and controlling, 
in an attempt to hold on to power and control within the municipality. External 
political interference hinders an already vulnerable system of checks and 
balances within the municipality from this perspective as well, since an incapable 
mayor would certainly not be able to exercise effective oversight of the municipal 
manager, as is required by law. 
 
4.5 Politically appointed section 56 managers disturb the synergy in the 
relationship between the executive mayor and municipal manager 
 
The appointment of managers who are directly accountable to municipal 
managers is a highly contentious issue in local government. Although legislation 
dictates that the council must consult with the municipal manager before 
appointing these managers, the ultimate appointment lies with council. In practice 
this does not work well as the municipal manager is in charge of his or her 
administration, and thus, having politicians determine who will be managers 
heading the relevant departments that the municipal manger is ultimately 
responsible for creates a doubt as to whether this is not in fact an encroachment 
of the area of supervision of the municipal manager.  
 
Research illustrates that there is general discontent about the appointment being 
made by the council, with an overall opinion that these appointments should be 
made by the municipal manager, as he or she is the individual to whom these 
managers are after all accountable to.  
 
Research further illustrates that there is confusion around who should discipline 
these managers.118 This uncertainty inevitably creates a tension in the 
                                                 
118
 De Visser, May and Steytler (2009) 44.  
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relationship between the municipal manager and executive mayor, as respective 
heads of the political and administrative sectors of the municipality.  
 
An ex-municipal manager who was interviewed describes the irregularity in the 
practice of section 56 managers being appointed by the council. He confirms that 
it is a challenge to exercise control over individuals that have not been appointed 
by the municipal manager, yet to be responsible for their performance.  
 
MM: There is a huge problem with the legislation in relation to section 56 
appointments. The MM is responsible for the performance of the 
administration, yet these managers are appointed by council. How do you 
exercise control over people that you have not appointed, and whose 
capabilities you know nothing about? 
 
The same previous municipal manager shares that the section 56 managers 
appointed are often not the people that the municipal manager would have 
considered appointing, had the decision been his.  
 
MM: I would have appointed only ONE of the seven directors, had it been 
up to me! 
 
This suggests that managers appointed are often not selected because they may 
be the best person for the job. Inevitably, being the person “in charge” of these 
managers, would lead the municipal manager to be discouraged. 
 
Mayors themselves prove to be of the opinion that there would be a much better 
synergy within the organization of a municipality should the appointments of 
section 56 managers be made by the municipal manager, with no council 
involvement. This view is confirmed by an ex-executive mayor who was 
interviewed. 
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Mayor: Section 56 managers should be the municipal manager’s domain, 
because he is the foremost accounting officer. When I deal with the 
municipal manager’s performance, this crowd is not there, he deals 
directly with their performances. He signs their contracts.  
 
Legislation puts them next to council, but they are supposed to be 
disciplined by the MM. Now, the MM tells us that he has a problem with X, 
then we give him permission to now deal with him. That takes about 3-4 
months to discipline. But, he should be able to suspend somebody as 
soon as he gets the details of their offense… From a cooperative point of 
view, if I am the MM, I would want the best people, I would head-hunt, 
because I don’t want to fail, it should be the prerogative of the MM to be 
able to do that. 
 
With mayors too being sympathetic to the predicament that municipal managers 
are forced into in terms of the appointment of section 56 managers, it is evident 
that there is a general sense that these managers should be appointed by the 
individual to whom they are accountable, i.e. the municipal manager.  
 
An ex-executive mayor who had a good working relationship with his municipal 
manager explains how the politically appointed section 56 managers potentially 
create problems in the relationship between the mayor and the municipal 
manager, as well as the mayor and the external political structures. They do so 
by using the mayor as a point of contact, as opposed to confronting the municipal 
manager directly, as would be required. When the mayor poses to be resistant to 
entertaining the manager, he or she would report the mayor to external political 
structures.  
 
Mayor: When the MM gives him instructions and he does not obey them, 
he comes to me, and that’s where the problems start between the MM and 
I or between the 3 of us. I have consistently refused to entertain anybody 
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bypassing the MM. I have had lots of people coming to my office with 
problems, wanting me to lend an ear, I would not accommodate them. 
Problems have to come to me via the MM and nobody else. But because 
of their political leverage, people would say things like: “I was in the 
vicinity so I thought let me check on you”. I understood that he does not 
want to discuss with issue with the MM because his ideas would not fly 
with the MM.  These people would then go to the external structures and 
say: “That mayor is not cooperative, we have these good ideas but he only 
listens to the MM, maybe because he is white…” Now it becomes a race 
issue.  
 
The appointment of section 56 managers by the political arm of the municipality 
can therefore be seen as a situation that has a significant indirect impact on the 
relationship between the executive mayor and municipal manager, to the extent 
that even in a situation where the two individuals have a good working 
relationship, this is threatened by the involvement of politically appointed 
managers. 
 
A suggestion by an ex-municipal manager interviewed on the way forward with 
regard to municipal managers and the section 56 managers is that they should 
operate like a board of directors and a CEO, with the CEO appointing and 
disciplining all those who are accountable to him or her.  
  
MM: It should be a clear-cut thing, that council appoints the CEO, who is 
the MM. Like all boards, from there on, all the people that must report to 
him, he must appoint. So that when he wants to lash out at somebody, he 
is not afraid, because lots of MM’s are afraid to touch on directors 
because the director has a good relationship with the mayor or the ANC. 
 
The municipal manager appointing section 56 managers could thus be seen as a 
means of protecting the municipal manager from political interference in his or 
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her work, in so far as the municipal manager would be better placed to reprimand 
underperforming managers, with no fear of him or herself subsequently being 
reprimanded by the political party.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The current chapter introduced the problems experienced in the interface of the 
executive mayor and the municipal manager. The problem areas were identified 
through research as being circumstances where the executive mayor cannot 
exercise his or her supervisory role as a result of political deployment; executive 
mayors exceed their supervisory role by interfering in the work of the municipal 
manager; the relationship between the executive mayor and municipal manager 
is circumvented by external political structures and the appointment of section 56 
managers being made by the council has an indirect negative effect on the 
relationship between the executive mayor and the municipal manager. The paper 
will proceed to discuss legislative reform that is underway, which could possibly 
address the problems identified.  
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Chapter 5: Legislative reform 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The current chapter will explore legislative reform that is presently underway, 
which seeks to address some of the identified irregularities that were identified 
above. Applicable legislation in this regard includes the institution of certain 
provisions of the Municipal Systems Amendment Bill, 2010 as well as the draft 
Disciplinary Code and Procedures for Senior Managers. 119 The view favoured by 
the paper is that while the reform of legislation, as proposed, would be effective 
in grappling with the challenges identified, it would not be sufficient in addressing 
all of the challenges. 
 
5.2  Institution of certain provisions of the Municipal Systems     
Amendment Bill, 2010 
 
Whilst not set in stone as yet, the Municipal Systems Amendment Bill, 2010 
proves to be a useful tool in assisting to address some of the challenges 
identified in the relationship between the municipal manager and the executive 
mayor. The relevant provisions in this regard will follow, with a discussion on how 
the said provision will improve the interface.  
 
Section 2 of the Bill, which includes the insertion of section 54A to the current Act 
deals exclusively with the appointment of municipal managers and acting 
municipal managers. For purposes of the paper, the sub-provisions of section 
54A are of concern.  
 
                                                 
119
 Municipal Systems Act: Disciplinary Code and Procedures for Senior Managers: For Public Comment.  
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Sections 54A(2) and (3) propose that a municipal manager must have the skills, 
expertise, competencies and qualifications prescribed by regulation,120 and 
should such requirement not be fulfilled and a municipal manager yet appointed, 
the appointment would be deemed null and void. Should the municipality be 
unsatisfied with the initial pool of candidates that it attracts, it may re-advertise 
the position until such time as it finds the appropriate person.121 The extensive 
provision of section 54A proves to be a great attempt to do away with external 
influence in the appointments of the municipal manager as it strongly encourages 
that only the best person for the job be appointed, as opposed to leaving 
loopholes in the system, which allows for the appointment of individuals who are 
not deemed as being ideal for the position. Appointments would, as a result, be 
effected primarily on merit.  
 
This provision essentially serves to entrench the precedent established in the 
case of Vuyo Mlokoti v Amathole District Municipality and Mlami Zenzile122  which 
holds that meeting the professional competency requirements of the municipal 
manager cannot, by any means be compromised, even if political authorities 
prefer so for any reason. The provision further carries an internal punitive 
measure, which states that any councilor who votes in favour of a decision that is 
in contravention of section 54A may be held personally liable for any fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure that the municipality may incur as a result of the 
invalidity.123 This provision extends the principle set out in the Mlokoti case, in 
that should a councilor take instructions even from superior political counterparts, 
the councilor would be left personally liable should the appointment be 
illegitimately made. The consequence of this is that councilors would be weary of 
receiving instructions from external political structures, and acting on them in an 
ad hoc manner, for fear of suffering personal liability should they do so.  
                                                 
120 The Municipal Systems Act regulations on competency, which would run parallel to the MFMA 
competency regulations. 
121 S 2(5) Municipal Systems Amendment Bill.  
122 Vuyo Mlokoti v Amathole District Municipality and Mlami Zenzile (2009) 30 ILJ 517 (E). 
123
 S 2(10) Municipal Systems Amendment Bill. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
61 
 
The same requirements outlined above in relation to the municipal manager are 
extended to the managers that are directly accountable to the municipal 
manager, i.e. section 56 managers, in terms of a proposed amendment to 
section 56 of the Act. This modification serves to again prevent tampering in 
appointments, especially in cases, as described above, where the politically 
appointed directors are simply unskilled and ill-equipped to fill their onerous 
positions. The potential consequence of the institution of these provisions would 
be an overall, well-capacitated administration. 
 
A critical provision in the Bill is one that disallows a municipal manager or 
manager directly accountable to a municipal manager to hold political office, in 
any capacity.124 This provision would serve to address many of the qualms noted 
by respondents in that it would abolish the practice of the appointment of 
incompetent staff, simply as a result of political standing, who offer secondary 
preference to their very crucial jobs within the municipality. The practice of having 
municipal managers and senior managers who rank higher than the executive 
mayor politically, and are thus controlling of the executive mayor would no longer 
be. The result of this provision again encourages a single vision for the municipal 
manager and executive mayor, which is not tainted by political ethos. It thus 
would enhance a good working relationship, embodied by competency and focus 
on service delivery.  
 
Section 6 of the Bill, which creates an amendment to section 57 of the current 
Act extends and promotes the necessity of ensuring entrenched terms of 
reference to be housed within the employment contract of the municipal manager 
and senior managers and is to be signed by both parties before the 
                                                 
124
 S 5 Municipal Systems Amendment Bill. The meaning of “Political Office” is given expression in 
section 1 of the Bill, where it is stated that “political office” in relation to a political party means the 
position of chairperson, deputy chairperson, secretary, deputy secretary or treasurer of the party nationally 
or in any province, region or other area in which the party operates. 
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commencement of service.125 This provision is important as it ensures 
compliance with the terms of reference requirement, in that the terms of 
reference form part of the employment contract which must be signed by both 
parties before commencement of services. This practice would ensure that roles 
are clearly defined, and committed to writing, so that, especially in the case of the 
municipal manager and executive mayor, each incumbent would be absolutely 
certain of the scope of their respective duties, and there would thus be no excuse 
for failure to perform, or interference within the domain of the other individual’s 
scope of work.   
 
The issue of an overall lack of competence and integrity of employees within the 
municipality was raised consistently in research. That municipal managers were 
appointed despite background checks which indicated that they were implicated 
in misconduct in previous municipalities was raised in interviews. The Municipal 
Systems Amendment Bill seeks to address this to a degree in that it regulates the 
employment of dismissed municipal employees from other municipalities and 
municipal employees who are subject to a disciplinary process.126 The history of 
the employee therefore has to be well established prior to any appointment being 
made. A value judgment is then to be made in terms of the nature of the 
misconduct, if any, in deciding on employment. This provision thereby eliminates 
the possibility of appointing individuals who have a history of incompetence or 
poor performance.  
 
Should the outlined provisions of the Municipal Systems Amendment Bill, 2010 
be promulgated, it would, if implemented together will the other changes that are 
recommended herein, be greatly beneficial with regard to the interface between 
the political and administrative arms, specifically in terms of insisting competency 
of the municipal manager and senior managers, thus facilitating the working 
relationship with the executive mayor.  
                                                 
125
 S 6(1)(b) and (c) Municipal Systems Amendment Bill.  
126
 S 7 Municipal Systems Amendment Bill. 
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5.3 Institution of the draft Disciplinary Code and Procedures for Senior 
Managers127 
 
The draft Code is aimed at effectively disciplining senior management (including 
the municipal manager), while at the same time protecting the municipal 
manager from frivolous suspensions. The draft Code further ensures fair and 
expeditious procedures of disciplinary proceedings. The Code sets out extensive, 
elaborate disciplinary procedures. It further entails procedures for dealing with 
substandard performance in management.128 
 
Should the draft Code be promulgated, it would serve to address several of the 
problems in the executive mayor / municipal manager interface identified: the 
issue again of incompetence of the municipal manager or senior managers would 
be dealt with, as proper channels would then exist for instituting and carrying out 
disciplinary proceedings. The flip side of the coin would also be addressed. This 
is the situation where the municipal manager is vulnerable before the executive 
mayor in instances where the executive mayor instructs the municipal manager 
to act in an illegitimate manner, and upon refusal, the job of the municipal 
manager is threatened. With the introduction of the Code, the municipal manager 
would have to be subjected to regulated disciplinary proceedings and thereby be 
afforded a fair opportunity to raise his or her case. The municipal manager would 
thereby be protected from political exploitation. The promulgation of the Code is 
therefore an excellent tool to facilitate a good working relationship between the 
municipal manager and the executive mayor, as it creates clearly defined routes 
to follow in instances where the executive mayor is displeased with the work of 
the municipal manager, yet at the same time would result in fairness towards the 
municipal manager.  
                                                 
127
 Municipal Systems Act: Disciplinary Code and Procedures for Senior Manages: For Public Comment. 
128
 Municipal Systems Act: Disciplinary Code and Procedures for Senior Manages: For Public Comment 
Chapter 3: “Substandard performance” means unacceptable or failing to meet the required standard or 
performing below an established standard.  
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5.4 Conclusion  
 
It is evident that should the current proposed legislative reform be instituted, this 
would have definite positive implications for the interface of the municipal 
manager and the executive mayor, especially in terms of appointments of 
municipal managers, where political deployments would be a thing of the past, 
and there would be an insistence on appointing individuals who are fit for the job. 
Municipal managers would further be protected from frivolous suspensions and 
politics, and be empowered as a consequence.  
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Chapter 6: Recommendations and conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
While the Municipal Systems Amendment Bill and draft Disciplinary Code would 
be beneficial in improving the interface of the executive mayor and municipal 
manager, it is not believed that the institution of these changes alone would 
serve to address all of the challenges identified.  
 
It is therefore proposed that the following recommendations be instituted, 
together with the legislative reform, in order to create a thorough overhaul of the 
current system to the extent that it addresses most of the problems identified in 
executive mayor / municipal manager interface.  
 
6.2 Section 56 appointments to be made by the municipal manger  
 
A huge problem experienced in the interface of the municipal manager and 
executive mayor lies in appointments generally, and specifically in the 
appointments of section 56 managers. These managers are appointed by the 
council, in consultation with the municipal manager.129 
 
Practice has revealed that there is often much manipulation and external 
influence involved in making these appointments. Often times individuals 
assigned to these positions are not at all competent and suitable for the position. 
As is the case with the municipal manager, these appointments are often made 
to individuals who rank highly within the political party. The consequences are 
that the municipal manager is left with an incompetent administration. It 
frequently happens that should the manager not agree on any matter with the 
municipal manager or be displeased with a directive from the municipal manager, 
the manager would revert directly with his or her grievances to the executive 
                                                 
129
 S 56 Municipal Systems Act. 
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mayor. Should the executive mayor fail to entertain these managers, they 
proceed to complain to the political party directly, of not only the municipal 
manager, but the executive mayor as well. Again, the fusion of politics and 
administration comes into play and creates stumbling blocks within the 
municipality.  
 
It is the recommendation of the paper that the municipal manager, as head of the 
administration should be the relevant person to appoint his or her managers, for 
whom he or she would be responsible. The municipal manager would thus be 
entrusted to appoint his or her administrators, who would be the best suited 
persons to carry out their respective functions with no obligation to serve any 
political interest. To this end, the relationship between the executive mayor and 
the municipal manager would be strengthened as there would be a decrease in 
political interference in the appointment of the senior managers, which would 
serve to abolish the identified frustrations that the municipal manager 
experiences in this regard. The executive mayor would be in charge of his or her 
executive committee and the municipal manager of his or her administration, 
both now fully capacitated powers.  
 
6.3 Recommendations to counter interference of executive mayors 
 
While the suggested legislative reform outlined above is believed to have positive 
effects on the relationship between the municipal manager and the executive 
mayor, there are certain peripheral changes and supplementations that, if 
effected would be highly beneficial to the aforesaid relationship. A topical 
problem noted in the research is the constant interference of executive mayors 
within the outlined area of the municipal manager’s work. In this regard, there are 
several recommendations that can be made which would, it is believed, if not 
abolish the problem, ameliorate it significantly.  
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Section 11(a) of the Code of Conduct130 states that councilors may not interfere 
in the management or administration of the municipal council, unless mandated 
to do so by council. This provision is problematic in that it qualifies the 
requirement of non-interference, by allowing it in circumstances where council 
does. There exist no justifiable grounds for conditional interference. It is 
unnecessary to make a proviso as such, as this only creates loopholes for 
unnecessary meddling, often by the executive mayor in the domain of the 
municipal manager.  
 
Section 11(b) of the same Code prevents a councilor, which includes an 
executive mayor, from giving or purporting to give instructions to any employee of 
the council, except when authorized to do so. This exception of allowing a 
councilor to give instructions to an employee when authorized again opens the 
provision to abuse, by virtue of its elusive phrasing. It is also unclear on who is to 
give authority. Is it the mayor? Is it the council? Surely such an elusive provision 
as regards such an already contentious area opens the floodgates for 
unnecessary interference. It is therefore held that the condition contained in this 
provision is again futile, with its implementation having potentially negative 
effects. It should be fully removed.  
 
Perhaps the gravest case of interference, yet the most prominent form thereof by 
the executive mayor in the area of work of the municipal manager lies in supply 
chain management. Section 117 of the MFMA categorically bars councilors of 
any municipality from being a member of a municipal bid committee or any other 
committee evaluating or approving tenders, quotations, contracts or other bids, 
nor are they allowed to attend any such meetings as observers. Section 118 of 
the MFMA reinforces this by stating that no person may interfere with the supply 
chain management system of a municipality; or amend or temper with any 
tenders, quotations, contracts or bids after their submission.  
 
                                                 
130
 Schedule 1: Municipal Systems Act. 
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Despite these provisions making it clear that the executive mayor is by no means 
allowed to be a part of supply chain processes, it is often the case that the 
executive mayor simply instructs the municipal manager on how tenders should 
be dealt with. Despite being clear that there should be no tampering with the 
tenders, the provisions relating to supply chain management are silent in terms of 
how tampering with tenders would be dealt with. Section 173 of the MFMA, which 
deals with criminal proceedings merely states that a councilor would be guilty of 
an offense should the councilor interfere in the financial management 
responsibilities of the municipality, or deliberately influence the accounting 
officer, 131 an offense for which a guilty person could be jailed or fined.132 The 
legislation fails in expressly addressing the very topical problem of abuse of 
supply chain management, the effect of which is again the need for an indirect 
inference to be made in order to bring an offender to book.  
 
The recommendation is that since abuse of supply chain management is as 
pertinent as it is, it should be an explicit provision within section 173 that abuse of 
supply chain procedures is a criminal offense,133 the charges of which should not 
allow the mere payment of a fine, but should include an extended imprisonment 
period. The consequences of being found guilty should further be extended to the 
criteria for becoming a councilor, so that these requirements should include a 
provision stating the following: no person who has previously been found guilty of 
contravening supply chain management provisions shall be allowed to serve as a 
councilor in any municipality. It is believed that a harsh stance is required to 
combat political influence within tender proceedings. Not only will such 
supplementation in legislation deter the executive mayor from interfering, but 
such deterrence will enable focus on actual municipal problems and thus 
strengthen the relationship between the executive mayor and municipal 
                                                 
131
 S 173(4) MFMA.  
132
 S 174 MFMA.  
133
 This should further be elaborated on- “abuse” should be defined to include “interference”, which should 
include the mere issuing of instructions as regards the issuing of tenders.  
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manager, who will no longer experience the constant tension of being faced with 
providing such “favours” to anybody.  
 
A consequence of interference by the executive mayor in the work of the 
municipal manager is that the municipal manager is often placed in a 
compromising situation, of having to carry out the illegitimate “favour” for the 
mayor, or having the security of his or her job in jeopardy. To counter this 
problem it is suggested that the possibility of a focus on periodic performance 
contracts for municipal managers should be explored.134 Should this practice be 
instituted, then in the event that the job of the municipal manager is threatened 
by politicians, it would be easy to ascertain if the municipal manager has 
performed in accordance with his or her expectation, and if he or she has 
performed, then surely this would serve as an effective leverage against political 
muscle. This practice, implemented together with the elaborate disciplinary 
proceedings of the draft Code, would protect the municipal manager significantly 
from political influences, especially in terms of job security.  
 
With the introduction of these simple nips and tucks in legislation, the incidence 
of the interference by the executive mayor or politicians generally in the domain 
of the municipal manager and his or her administration would be curbed 
effectively.  
 
6.4 Establishing competency within the office of the executive mayor  
 
Much has been spoken of the need to instill competency in the office of the 
municipal manager, with legislative reform underway intended to address the 
problems associated with the municipal manager. It, however, cannot be denied 
that although there are currently no formal requirements that need to be met in 
order to be an executive mayor, by nature, the position requires vast knowledge, 
                                                 
134
 This would create a focus on the ongoing performance of the municipal manager, as opposed to a fixed 
contract. 
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skill, ability and overall competence. Research, however, indicates that this is 
lacking in most ways. Executive mayors are either “puppets” of their political 
appointees, uneducated and thus do not appreciate that they have to act within 
the scope of their duties, or simply behave haphazardly and embody a don’t-care 
attitude.  
 
Several recommendations are proposed, that, it is believed, if implemented will 
result in a more competent executive mayor, and thus ensure a healthier 
interface with the municipal manager.  
 
There are currently only ad hoc training programmes that are in place which 
executive mayors can undergo,135 but no compulsory, standard, regulated 
training. It is thus suggested that national standards be established for training to 
be undertaken by all executive mayors, so that there is uniformity in training and 
thus realistic expectation of executive mayors; and in order to ensure that the 
relevant areas of practice, such as financial and project management are 
sufficiently emphasized on. This training should be applied across the country, 
and in a consistent ongoing manner, so as to ensure that executive mayors are 
kept abreast of all legal developments, and to create a platform for executive 
mayors to interact and provide support unto each other. 
 
Mayors should further be subjected to signing a performance management 
agreement with the council, similar to the requirement imposed on municipal 
managers. Performance in this regard should be assessed by the office of the 
Auditor General, so as to avoid any tampering or influences on the process. 
 
Residents should further be encouraged to participate in satisfaction surveys, 
thereby rating the performance of the executive mayor. This would encourage 
the accountability of the executive mayor to the people who effectively placed 
him or her in office and strengthen community leverage in running the 
                                                 
135
 Various tertiary institutions offer courses designed for local government deployees.  
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municipality, thereby excluding the extent of external political influences on the 
exercise of the duties of the executive mayor. Mechanisms should further be put 
in place to enable residents to recall a non-performing mayor.  
 
The institution of the above will capacitate the mayor and insist on competency in 
the office of the executive mayor.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The political / administrative interface is a complex one, specifically at local 
government, where challenges are compounded by an incredibly close working 
relationship. Unlike within national and provincial governments, problems 
experienced in each individual municipality are often overlooked, possibly due to 
the multiplicity of municipalities that exist. This however does not make the 
challenges faced any less of a problem. The executive mayor and municipal 
manager are of course at the fore of challenges. Having to deal with and 
consider conflicting motives, often influenced from beyond the municipality 
inevitably poses frustration and has a poor effect on the work ethos within the 
municipality. The paper has provided a detailed synopsis of the relationship 
between the two incumbents, identified the drawbacks that they experience in 
practice and provided possible solutions to these problems.  
 
The paper has illustrated how instituting certain provisions of the Municipal 
Systems Amendment Bill and the draft Disciplinary Code would have a positive 
impact on the executive mayor / municipal manager interface. Further 
recommendations beyond the promulgation of the aforesaid legislation were 
suggested above. It is supposed that should the relevant changes be effected 
within the local government sphere, as suggested, that the outcome would be 
effective in improving the relationship between the executive  mayor and 
municipal manager. 
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APPENDIX “A” 
Informed Consent Form 
 
 
Title of the Research: Political/ Administrative interface: the relationship 
between the municipal manager and executive 
mayor  
Researcher:   Fatima Surty, University of the Western Cape 
 
Study Purpose  
I am currently completing my LLM in Constitutional Litigation. As part of the 
requirements for the completion of the course I have to write a research paper. 
My research is focussed on local government law. The aim of the paper is to 
analyse the relationship between the municipal manager and executive mayor in 
a municipality, identify the weaknesses, and propose possible solutions to the 
problems. 
I would like to invite you to participate in the research study as I am interested in 
your opinions as you are one of the relevant incumbents on which the study is 
based and therefore relating your own experiences to me would be invaluable to 
my study. I am also interested in hearing any recommendations or suggestions that 
you may have. You may take some time to think about this consent form before 
making your decision to be a part of the study. 
Procedures 
If you agree to join the study, you will be asked to participate in an interview that 
will last for about 30 minutes. I will make an audio recording of the interview so 
that I can remember what you say. The recording will not have your name on it. 
Confidentiality 
The information that I collect from this research project will be kept confidential. 
Your name will not be written on data collection forms, and your name will not be 
used in any report coming from this study. Any information that might identify you 
will be removed. 
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All consent forms and recordings will be stored in a locked cupboard or with 
passwords, and only myself and my supervisor will have access to them.  
Participation and withdrawal 
You do not have to take part in this research if you do not wish to do so. You may 
stop participating in the interview at any time that you wish without consequence. 
You are not required to answer any questions that you are not comfortable with.  
Who to contact 
If you have questions about the study you may ask them now. You can also contact 
me at any time if you have any further questions about the study.  
Fatima Surty 
Tel: 083 2356 388 
Email: fatimasurty@gmail.com 
 
Signature Page 
I have read the information in this consent form.  All my questions about the study 
and my participation in it have been answered.  I freely consent to be in this 
research study. 
 
 
____________________________________________________ 
Participant Name (Please print)     Participant Signature  Date 
 
 
____________________________________________________ 
Interviewer Name (Please print)    Interviewer Signature  Date 
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APPENDIX “B” 
 
 
Interview Guide 
 
Political/ Administraive Interface: the relationship between the executive 
mayor and municipal manager 
Interviewers Name 
____________________ 
Today’s Date 
____________________ 
Time Interview Started 
____________________ 
Time Interview Ended 
____________________ 
Has the consent form been reviewed 
with the participant? 
____________________ 
Has the consent form been 
signed by the participant? 
____________________ 
Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. For this interview I would 
like to ask you a few questions about your experience as municipal manager/ 
executive mayor, especially as it relates to your relationship with the municipal 
manger/ executive mayor of your municipality.  
 
Questions posed to municipal managers: 
 
1. How long are you serving as municipal manger? 
2. Do you hold a position in any political party? What position?  
3. Do you think that a political deployment to an administrative position is 
problematic in practice? Do you think it should be abolished as a practice? 
4. Describe your working relationship with the executive mayor. 
5. Identify areas of tension in your relationship with the executive mayor.  
6. Does the executive mayor adequately carry out his/her “oversight” role in 
terms of section 52 of the MFMA? How is this practically distinguished 
from interference in your work? 
Interview No.: ______ 
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7. Do you believe that the executive mayor is sufficiently skilled to carry out 
an oversight role; deal with budgets and financial affairs; manage the IDP 
and performance management systems etc? 
8. How do unskilled mayors and councilors affect you? 
9. Does your municipality have an oversight committee? What is its function? 
10. Does your municipality have an elaborate, comprehensive delegations 
system? How effective is such a system in practice? 
11. Does your municipality have a “terms of reference” for each relevant 
incumbent within the municipality? How effective is this in determining 
roles and responsibilities, accountability, etc? 
12. Performance targets for you: are these set on realistic standards? 
13. Are you ever asked to carry out “favors” for the mayor? Does he/she ever 
try to influence your decisions? How do you deal with these? 
14.  Have any of your staff members been appointed as a “political” 
deployment? How does this affect you? 
15. Who disciplines section 56 appointments? Are you satisfied with their 
appointment being made by the council? 
16. Are the requirements for directors strictly adhered to in appointments? 
17.  Does the interference of external political structures (regional, provincial 
and national) affect you? How? 
18.  The MFMA disallows the mayor to be involved in procurement processes 
or financial dealings on a whole. Does the current system within the 
municipality allow the mayor to get around this? How? What does this 
mean for you as accounting officer? 
19. In terms of section 32(3) of the MFMA, do you often have to report on 
wasteful expenditure? How is this received by the mayor? 
20.  Section 60 of the MFMA requires you to provide guidance and advice on 
compliance with the Act to political structures. Does this happen in 
practice? How is it received? 
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21.  Do you have any suggestions or recommendations to improve the 
interface of the executive mayor and municipal manger, or any other final 
comments? 
 
Questions posed to executive mayors: 
 
1. How long have you been serving as executive mayor? 
2. Describe your working relationship with the municipal manager. 
3. Identify areas of tension in your relationship with the municipal manager.  
4. Is the municipal manager politically deployed/ a senior member of a 
political party? If yes, how doest his affect your relationship with him/her? 
5. Would disallowing a senior member of a political party to be appointed to 
the administration of the municipality improve the working situation for 
you? 
6. Do you find that your municipal manager is too “by the book”? 
7. Do you believe that you exercise adequate oversight over the municipal 
manager? How do you ensure not to cross the “oversight” line and not 
“interfering”? 
8. When you were elected as executive mayor, there was no skill/ 
professional requirement for your deployment, yet your work involves high 
skilled competencies, i.e. managing the complex IDP and performance 
management process, oversight of the municipal manager, working on 
budgets and technical financial matters. Do you believe that you are 
skilled enough to carry out these tasks? Would placing an obligation on 
political parties to deploy skilled individuals to the position of executive 
mayor result in a more effective system of local government? 
9. What is the role of external political structures (regional/ provincial or 
national) on your decision-making? 
10. Do you receive external political directives on staff appointments? How 
does this affect the performance and working environment within the 
municipality? 
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11. How do you suggest external political interference be abolished? 
12. Are the legislative requirements of the appointments of municipal 
managers and directors strictly adhered to? 
13. Who disciplines section 56 managers? Do you not think that since they 
are “managers under the municipal manger”, that it would be more 
effective if they were appointed by the municipal manger? 
14. Does your municipality have a coherent delegations system? Is it 
effective? 
15. Does your municipality have a coherent “terms of reference” document for 
each respective incumbent? How effective is it in stipulating roles and 
responsibilities, accountability systems, checks and balances etc? 
16.  Do you think that the draft disciplinary code and procedures for senior 
managers would be effective when applied to municipal managers and 
ameliorate challenges faced in your relationship with him/her? 
17. How do you feel about provisions of the new Municipal Systems 
Amendment Bill? Would they improve the working environment at the 
municipality, especially in relation to your relationship with the municipal 
manager? 
18. Do have any final comments or suggestions on how to improve the 
interface of the municipal manger and executive mayor at local 
government? 
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